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1. Introduction  
Enterprise networks are the main targets for hackers or intruders due to the fact that most 
financial transactions take place online and the networks also handle vast amounts of data 
and other resources (Satti & Garner, 2001). Handling transactions online is on the increase 
everyday because it makes life easier for both the customers as well as the enterprises 
offering services (Jou et al., 2000; Yau & Xinyu Zhang, 1999; Ko, 2003; Tront & Marchany, 
2004). Enterprise networks also have lots of bandwidth, which is very attractive to hackers 
because they take advantage of that by using those networks as launching pads to attack 
others (Tront & Marchany, 2004; Janakiraman et al., 2003). It therefore becomes very difficult 
for the IDSs and IPSs at the receiving end to detect and prevent the attacks or hackers, since 
the packet header information will indicate legitimate senders. This is the main reason why 
most IPSs are easily bypassed by hackers (Tront & Marchany, 2004; Paulson, 2002; Weber, 
1999). Intrusion prevention, which is a proactive technique, prevents the attacks from 
entering the network. Unfortunately, some of the attacks still bypass the intrusion 
prevention systems. Intrusion detection on the other hand, detects attacks only after they 
have entered the network. 
Although attacks are generally assumed to emanate from outside a given network, the most 
dangerous attacks actually emanate from the network itself. Those are really difficult to 
detect since most users of the network are assumed to be trusted people. The situation has 
necessitated drastic research work in the area of network security, especially in the 
development of intrusion detection and prevention systems intended to detect and prevent 
all possible attacks on a given network (Akujuobi & Ampah, 2007; Akujuobi et al., 2007a; 
Akujuobi et al., 2007b; Akujuobi et al., 2007c; Akujuobi & Ampah, 2009). These IDSs use 
either anomaly or signature-based detection techniques. Anomaly detection techniques 
detect both known and unknown attacks, but signature-based detection techniques detect 
only known attacks. The main approaches of anomaly detection techniques are statistical, 
predictive pattern generation, neural networks, and sequence matching and learning. The 
main approaches of signature-based detection techniques are expert systems, keystroke 
monitoring, model-based, state transition analysis, and pattern matching (Biermann et al., 
2001). There is no existing IDS or IPS that can detect or prevent all intrusions. For example, 
configuring a firewall to be 100% foolproof compromises the very service provided by the 
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network. The use of conventional encryption algorithms and system level security 
techniques have helped to some extent, but not to the levels expected (Fadia, 2006; 
Leinwand & Conroy, 1996; Stallings, 2003). The following are the five limitations associated 
with existing IDSs (Satti & Garner, 2001):  
1. Use of central analyzer: Whenever the central analyzer is attacked by an intruder the 
whole system will be without protection, so it becomes a single point of failure 
(Janakiraman et al., 2003); 
2. Limited scalability: Processing all data at a central point limits the size of the entire 
network that can be monitored and controlled at a time. Data collection in a distributed 
fashion also causes excessive traffic in the network (Kayacik et al., 2004); 
3. Effectiveness: The ability of existing IDSs/IPSs to detect and prevent intrusion is still 
not clearly established because of high false positive and false negative rates (Chunmei 
et al., 2004); 
4. Efficiency: Quantifying resources like time, power, bandwidth, and storage used by 
existing IDSs will be a critical success factor (Khoshgoftaar & Abushadi, 2004); and 
5. Security: Securing the security data itself from intruders is also a very important 
limitation to existing IDSs. 
It is still an open problem to develop IDSs and IPSs to detect and prevent SNY-flood attacks, 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks based on SYN-flood attacks, and also eliminate 
some or all of the limitations of existing IDSs. Although many IDS and IPS techniques have 
been proposed for securing networks from attacks, problems with SYN-flood attacks and 
DDoS attacks based on SYN-flood attacks have not been resolved. Also, there is no research 
work that has attempted to solve the above problems nor have there been attempts to 
eliminate the majority or all of the five major problems of existing IDSs. Most research 
works solved only one or two of the major problems. Our approach will resolve the above 
problems through the following steps: 
1. Design an IDS technique based on a well established model (i. e. discrete binary 
communication Channels), which will be used as a back-up for existing IDS to help 
eliminate serious attacks like  SYN-flood attacks and DDoS attacks based on SYN-flood 
attacks; and 
2. Transmit all security data from the network directly to the central detection point for 
analysis instead of transmitting them through the network itself. 
Step one aims at solving the problems with effectiveness of existing IDSs. Step two aims at 
solving the problems with efficiency (i. e. saving bandwidth), security (i. e. securing security 
data from intruders), and limited scalability (i. e. reducing traffic in the network). These are 
the objectives of our approach. 
2. Background 
The following major approaches are used to manage network security problems: 
i. Intrusion Detection (traditional); and  
ii. Intrusion Prevention (proactive). 
The basic techniques used by the two approaches are as follows: 
i. Signature based detection system (Attack patterns are considered as signatures); 
ii. Anomaly detection system (Anything unusual is considered as suspect); 
iii. Distributed intrusion detection system (Data is collected and analyzed in a distributed 
fashion); and 
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iv. Centralized intrusion detection system (Data is collected in a distributed fashion but 
analyzed centrally). 
The use of intrusion detection and prevention techniques in addition to other authentication 
techniques has become very necessary in managing enterprise network security. A layer 
approach is often used since there is no single technique that guarantees absolute security 
against all attacks on a given network. Very strong authentication techniques will also help 
prevent attacks from within the network. Depending on where the IDS software is installed, 
it can be referred to as network based intrusion detection system (NIDS) or host based 
intrusion detection system (HIDS). NIDS ensures preventive control of a given system, 
whiles HIDS ensures detective control. The following are some existing NIDS: Internet 
Security Systems Real Secure, Network Security Wizard Dragon IDS, Symantec Net Prowler, 
Cisco Systems Net Ranger, Network Flight Recorder Intrusion, Detection Appliance, 
Network Ice Black Ice Defender, CyberSafe Centrax, and Snort. The following are some 
existing HIDS: Internet Security Systems Real Secure, Symantec Intruder Alert, CyberSafe 
Centrax, and Tripwire.  
Securing information on data networks and the networks themselves have become very 
difficult tasks considering the diverse types and number of intrusions being recorded daily. 
There is a lot of ongoing research work in the area of data network security management to 
develop techniques to combat intruders because of the financial losses incurred by 
enterprises due to activities of intruders (Paez & Torres, 2009; Jing-Wen et al., 2009; Kui, 
2009; Lixia et al., 2009; Momenzadeh et al., 2009; Jing et al., 2009; Ihn-Han  & Olariu, 2009; 
Cannady, 2009; Changxin & Ke, 2009; Wei et al., 2009). This effort should seriously include 
securing networks also, and that is exactly what this IDS proves to do. Research work in 
network security can be categorized into three major areas: intrusion detection systems only; 
intrusion prevention systems only; and combined intrusion detection and intrusion 
prevention systems. 
2.1 Intrusion detection systems 
Intrusion detection, which is a traditional technique, detects attacks only after they have 
entered the network. The analysis of IDSs in terms of advantages and disadvantages was 
done in (Vokorokos et al., 2006). This study was purely theoretical and it was proposed to 
consider different types of IDSs based on attack types, and whether attacks are directed 
towards a whole network, a sub network or a host. It will finally consider at the 
implementation stage, the important criterion for determining which layers of the ISO/OSI 
model will be covered by the IDSs including their ranges of operation. The importance of an 
automated intrusion response and further proposal on a dynamic intrusion response known 
as Gnipper vaccine was highlighted in (Zhaoyu & Uppala, 2006). This is a countermeasure, 
which uses dynamic agents to mitigate denial of service attacks. Although the approach 
provided an efficient and effective response to an intrusion with very little overhead, future 
work in this effort will focus on developing an efficient “trust model.” A pattern matching 
NIDS, which consists of four modules: collection module, analysis module, response 
module and attack rule library was developed in (Zhou et al., 2006).  
The system is based on Common Intrusion Detection Framework (CIDF) architecture and 
mature intrusion detection technology. Although efficient and effective, the system has to 
include anomaly detection in the future. An intrusion detection engine based on neural 
networks combined with a protection method, which is based on watermarking techniques, 
was presented in (Mitrokotsa et al., 2007). This engine exploits two research areas, that is, 
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visual representation and watermarking, which have not been used in mobile ad hoc 
network (MANET) in the past. The advantages of eSOM and visual representation in 
achieving intrusion detection were demonstrated. The use of the proposed engine with 
various routing protocols, for detecting various types of attacks and testing real MANET in 
the future was emphasized. An approach to combat threats from worms, insiders, and 
attackers with a toehold was discussed in (Weaver et al., 2007). This was done by exploiting 
the VLAN capabilities of modern switches to enforce that all LAN communications must 
traverse and meet the approval of an intrusion detection monitor that operates separately 
from the switch. Two benefits were realized here: deployment and operation in today’s 
enterprise networks without requiring replacement of existing infrastructure and the use of 
highly flexible, commodity PCs for LAN monitoring, rather than algorithms embedded in 
difficult-to-reprogram custom hardware. Further work is required in the development of a 
mechanism capable of processing WAN traffic and not only LAN traffic as described here.  
A novel feature classification scheme for features that can be extracted by sniffing the 
network was introduced in (Onut & Ghorbani, 2006). It further gives a better understanding 
for real-time features that can be extracted from packets in order to detect intrusions. 
Preliminary results are promising for mapping the network features into the network attack 
domain. Future work will introduce statistical analysis of subsets of features versus specific 
attacks and attack categories in order to determine the necessary set of features to be 
analyzed by an IDS/IPS. Research into the question as to whether one can detect attacks 
without keeping per-flow state was initiated in (Ramana et al., 2007). It suggests that a 
tradeoff between performance and completeness may not be as Draconian as is commonly 
thought. Some progress has been made for bandwidth-based and partial completion DoS 
attacks, and scan-based attacks including worms, but the general problem still remains very 
difficult. Further work is needed concerning issues of “behavioral aliasing” and “spoofing” 
in such scalable solutions. An introduction to new evasion methods, presentation of test 
results for confirming attack outcomes based on server responses, and proposal of a 
methodology for confirming response validity were discussed in (Chaboya et al., 2006). 
These methods must be implemented as either analyst guidance or preferably in a NIDS 
plug-in or similar software solution. Also, these methods lead to the development of 
payload-size and shell-code-matching filters for Snort. Future work looks promising in 
reducing both the analyst workload and the risk from evasion attacks. 
A framework for internet banking security using multi-layered, feed-forward artificial 
neural networks was outlined in (Bignell, 2006). Anomaly detection techniques applied for 
transaction authentication and intrusion detection within internet banking security 
architectures were utilized. This comprehensive fraud detection model via networks 
technology has the potential to significantly limit present level of financial fraud 
experienced with existing fraud prevention techniques. A prototype for this neural network 
will be developed to quantitatively validate the effectiveness of this machine learning 
technique. An innovative approach to the design and implementation of a VoIP specific 
honeypot was presented in (Nassar et al., 2007). Simulation results from using this Session 
Initiation Protocol (SIP) specific honeypot look promising in relation to the effectiveness of 
the information gathering tools and the correctness of the inference engine deductions. 
Attempts to reduce false positive rates generated by cooperative Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDSs) in MANETs were discussed in (Otrok et al., 2007). This was done by 
analyzing the intrusion detected by mobile nodes within a cooperative game theoretic 
framework. Simulation results provided better results compared to existing methods.  
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An Incident Response Support System (IRSS) that correlates past and present events in 
order to classify attacks was introduced in (Capuzzi et al., 2006). This also serves as a 
preliminary report on a system to support the incident response activities of a security 
administrator. So far, a prototype has been implemented, but a massive set of experiments 
in order to evaluate the effectiveness of this system is underway. Plans to investigate new 
similarity metrics (for response retrieval) and more sophisticated adaptation algorithm will 
be dealt with in the future. A suit of detection techniques to identify fraudulent usage of 
mobile telecommunications services by exploiting regularities demonstrated in users’ 
behaviors was presented in (Sun et al., 2007). This leads to the creation of an end user’s 
profile for anomaly detection in wireless networks.  
The intrusion detection problem is formulated as a multi-feature two-class pattern 
classification problem, which applies Bayes Decision Rule to the collected data. Both 
algorithms can achieve good performance depending on the input parameters as indicated 
by results from simulation studies. More features need to be considered in the future so as to 
make the system more general and robust. A fully automated technique for detecting, 
preventing and reporting SQL Injection Attacks (SQLIAs) incidents was discussed in 
(Muthuprasanna et al., 2006). Preliminary evaluation results of a prototype developed 
against various performance metrics affecting web server performance was also provided. 
Solutions for these critical security issues in web applications ensure easy transition towards 
next generation web services.  
2.2 Intrusion prevention systems 
Intrusion prevention, which is a proactive technique, prevents the attacks from entering the 
network. Unfortunately, some of the attacks still bypass the intrusion prevention systems. A 
simple methodology for testing dynamic intrusion-prevention systems for McAfee 
Entercept version 5.0 and the Cisco Security Agent version 4.5 was developed in (Labbe et 
al., 2006). Although test results showed that neither of the products stood up to their 
required effectiveness, the Cisco product did better. This test even supports the fact that 
effectiveness is one of the major problems of existing IDSs and IPSs. A multiple joint 
prevention technique of information security in Storage Area Networks (SAN) environment 
was presented in (Zheng-De et al., 2006). Although this technique can greatly improve the 
ability of preventing intrusion, issues with misreporting of intrusion prevention in IDS and 
filch of information in SAN need to be considered in future. A novel pattern-matching 
algorithm, which uses ternary content addressable memory (TCAM) and capable of 
matching multiple patterns in a single operation was considered in (Weinberg et al., 2006). 
This system is compatible with Snort’s rules syntax, which is the de facto standard for 
intrusion prevention systems. This Network Intrusion Prevention System (NIPS) presents 
several advantages over existing NIPS devices.  
The necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of Byzantine agreement protocol 
to the intrusion detection problem were investigated in (Colon Osorio, 2007). This was done 
by developing a secure architecture and fault-resilient engine (SAFE), which is capable of 
tolerating such problems. This IPS eliminates some of the common shortcomings of existing 
IPSs. Both the implementation and evaluation stages are complete and require extra 
research work in relation to masquerading, distribution and protection of sensitive data, 
scalability and implementation issues. The link between concepts of the immune system in 
relation to the Danger Theory and components of operating system (such as application 
processes and sockets) was investigated in (Krizhanovsky & Marasanov, 2007). Although it 
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is expected to develop intrusion prevention systems out of this link, more work needs to be 
done for this to be achieved. A framework for protecting against buffer overflow attacks, the 
oldest and most pervasive attack technique was introduced and discussed in (Piromsopa & 
Enbody, 2006a). It was used to create an effective, hardware, buffer overflow prevention 
tool. A formal argument made here was that “a necessary condition for preventing buffer-
overflow attacks is the prevention of the integrity of addresses across domains.” A further 
description of how the above statement supports a variety of successful hardware-based 
methods to prevent buffer overflow attacks was given. 
Arbitrary copy, a type of buffer-overflow attack that is capable of bypassing most buffer-
overflow solutions was introduced in (Piromsopa & Enbody, 2006b). Work is still ongoing to 
extend Secure Bit, which is one of the most promising buffer-overflow protection 
techniques, to protect against buffer-overflow of non-control data. A better solution for 
Information Security management by designing Preventive Information Security 
Management (PrISM) aimed at developing and deploying an indigenous Information 
Security Management System (ISMS) with intrusion prevention capabilities was proposed in 
(Anwar et al., 2007). This solution is based on reverse engineering of Open Source Security 
Information Management (OSSIM) system. A new strategy for dealing with the impossible 
path execution (IPE) and mimicry attack in the N-gram base Host Intrusion Detection 
System (HIDS) model was introduced in (Bruschi et al., 2007). This is also a novel defensive 
technique, represented by the obfuscator module, which works in a transparent way and 
low overhead of 5.9% with the higher accuracy than the state of the art HIDS. Future work 
will consider using the obfuscator module in order to reduce the false rate and to detect 
other kinds of IPE attacks. 
2.3 Combined intrusion detection and prevention systems 
Combined intrusion detection and prevention systems take advantage of both the 
traditional and proactive approaches with the aim of eliminating some of the limitations of 
both systems. The use of active traffic splitters on the traffic with the goal of reducing the 
load on sensors, thereby improving performance in the detection and prevention of 
intrusion was presented in (Xinidis et al., 2006). Some improvements were made in terms of 
sensor performance for each of the methods used. The overall cost of the approach was also 
reasonable. An intelligent agent based intrusion detection and prevention system for mobile 
ad hoc networks was studied in (Sampathkumar et al., 2007). Although the developed 
system worked efficiently and detected intrusion at multiple levels, namely, user and packet 
levels, there is the chance of improving the efficiency in terms of time reduction and 
effectiveness in terms of increased prediction rate of the system by using training with more 
instances. A Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) intrusion detection and prevention architecture 
was implemented as an extension of the very popular open-source software Snort in 
(Niccolini et al., 2006). The results indicated that the quality of service experienced by clients 
did not decrease, hence signalling a good basis for further development of more advanced 
VoIP IDS/IPS solutions. The effective detection of both known and unknown attacks by 
means of unified real-time analysis of network traffic introduced by ESIDE-DEPIAN based 
on Bayesian Belief Networks concepts was established in (Bringas, 2007). This is referred to 
as a unified Intrusion Detection paradigm.  
An application-based intrusion detection and intrusion prevention (ID/IP) system coupled 
with data mining and mobile agent technologies was introduced in (Yee et al., 2006). This 
hybrid system, consisting of a core engine with data sensor, detector, configuration device 
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and alert and response device as its main components, uses both signature-based and 
anomaly based mechanisms in detecting and preventing intrusions. It further uses data 
mining and mobile agent technologies in providing a real-time adaptive and responsive ID 
and IP systems. An examination of integrated multiple intrusion detection sensors, which 
seek to minimize the number of incorrect-alarms was designed and implemented in 
(Beheshti & Wasniowski, 2007). The system was implemented using Open Software 
whenever possible such as Snort, Honeypot, MySQL, etc. This information fusion based 
intrusion detection and prevention model, which is a prototype, needs to include database 
design allowing for more efficient data fusion from multiple sensors.  
Proactive screening of the health of a corporate network and performing first aid by 
systematically monitoring vital signs of mobile devices within the network was outlined in 
(Ransbottom & Jacoby, 2006). Some of the vital signs to be used to detect and prevent system 
intrusion were registry content changes, active processes, open ports, power usage 
thresholds, and power signatures. This system provides a comprehensive overall 
assessment of a network, which leads to building broader immunities to help maintain the 
health of any enterprise network. A security model to protect IP Multimedia Subsystem 
(IMS) Service Delivery Platform (SDP) from different time independent attacks, e. g. SQL 
injection and media flow attacks was developed in (Sher & Magedanz, 2007). This is an 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) system for detecting and preventing message 
tempering and media flow attacks for IMS Service Delivery. The performance results at 
Open IMS Tested Fraunhofer show the processing delay of the IDP as very small. In the next 
section, we discuss a unified approach to network information security which is the main 
focus of this chapter. 
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Fig. 1. Implementation scheme for the developed technique 
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3. The intrusion detection technique  
Unlike most existing IPSs/IDSs, which depend on only packet header information or 
behavior for prevention and detection respectively, this approach goes further to consider 
using purely quantitative methods for detection and prevention. This new approach 
employed anomaly detection and host-based detection as its analysis strategy. Only two 
types of packets were considered by this approach: normal network packet and abnormal 
packet (i. e. any packet not classified as normal network packet). The classification of the 
two types of packets could be based on parameters like Hurst parameter, packet arrival rate, 
inter-arrival time between successive packets, etc., which cannot be easily manipulated by 
intruders or attackers. This idea is revisited at the implementation stages of this technique. 
Figure 1 shows how the implementation network looks like. The model for this approach 
was based on a discrete binary communication channel with detailed analysis of both a 
priori and a posteriori (conditional) probabilities. The novelty of this approach lies in the 
fact that no existing IDSs have been modeled as described here.   
4. Discrete communication channel  
The goal of a discrete communication channel or a discrete memoryless channel (DMC) is to 
derive an optimum receiver, which minimizes the average probability of message error. The 
receiver determines, which message mi was transmitted in order to maximize the 
probability of correct decision P(C) only after observing the received symbol rj. Figure 2 
describes the whole process. 
 
 
m0
M message 
inputs
mM-1
r0
rJ-1
J observable 
outputsDMC
 
Fig. 2. Discrete memoryless channel 
If equation (1) denotes the joint probability of transmitting mi and receiving rj, P(m ,r )i j
, 
then, the total probability of receiving rj, jP(r ) , is given by equation (2).  
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 P(m ,r ) P(m )* P(r / m )
i j i j i
=  (1) 
 
1
0
( ) ( , )
m
j k j
k
P r P m r
−
=
=∑  (2) 
where,  
( )iP m -  The probability of transmitting message mi; 
( / )j iP r m - The transitional (conditional) probability of receiving rj given that mi was 
transmitted; and 
( , )k jP m r -  The joint probability of transmitting mk and receiving rj. 
It is very important to note that ( )iP m depends solely on the message source (i. e. the a priori 
probability that message mi was transmitted). From Bayes’ rule, the a posteriori 
(conditional) probability (i. e. comes into play only after receiving symbol rj) that mi was 
transmitted given that rj was received (or observed), ( / )i jP m r  is given as follows: 
 
( / ) * ( )
( / )
( )
j i i
i j
j
P r m P m
P m r
P r
=  (3) 
Assuming that i jP(m / r ) is known, then, the optimum receiver has to map rj onto mi in 
order to minimize the probability of error in transmitting message mi. 
If ˆ ( )jm r denotes the transmitted symbol attributed to observing rj, then, equation (4) denotes 
an example of the decision by a receiver that m9 was transmitted given that r6 was observed.  
 6 9ˆ ( )m r m=   (4) 
Also, the conditional probability of a correct decision given that rj is observed, ( / )jP C r  is 
given by equation (5). This is also equivalent to an a posteriori probability. 
 ˆ( / ) ( ( ) / )j j jP C r P m r r=   (5) 
The maximum a posteriori (MAP) decision rule determines the optimum receiver by first 
maximizing ˆ ( )jm r , which in effect maximizes the conditional probability ˆ( ( ) / )j jP m r r  and 
finally maximizes ( / )jP C r . The total probability of a correct decision, ( )P C  given that rj is 
observed is therefore given as follows: 
 
1
0
( ) ( / ) * ( )
J
j j
j
P C P C r P r
−
=
=∑   (6) 
The probability ( )jP r  in equation (6) was earlier defined in equation (2). It is a positive term 
and also independent of the transmitted message. Therefore, it is clear that ( )P C will be 
maximized only if all terms of ( / )jP C r are maximized. The probability of error is given by 
equation (7) as follows: 
 ( ) 1 ( )P E P C= −   (7) 
www.intechopen.com
 Intrusion Detection Systems 
 
264 
With )( jrP being independent of the transmitted message, the decision rule reduces to 
equation (8) if and only if equation (9) holds (Ziemer & Tranter, 2002). 
 ( ) * ( / ) ( ) * ( / ) .k j k i j iP m P r m P m P r m for all i≥  (8) 
 ˆ ( )j km r m=   (9) 
5. Modeling technique 
The following were the assumptions made for this model: 
1. The network was assumed to have only one entry point (sender) and a number of nodes 
(receivers); 
2. It was assumed that a normal packet could be sent into the network, but will be 
received as an abnormal packet at a given node depending on what happened to it in 
transit; and 
3. The maximum and minimum probabilities (elements) in the 2 x 2 transitional 
(conditional) probability matrices were assumed to be 0.9 and 0.1 respectively. 
This model applied a quantitative approach based on Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) 
decision rule with the hope of improving the effectiveness of existing IDSs. The network 
was modeled based on a discrete binary communication channel having two possible input 
messages and two possible output symbols. It was further assumed to have only one entry 
point (sender) and a number of nodes (receivers). Finally, all normal operational packets 
were referred to as normal packets, but any other packets were referred to as abnormal 
packets. The developed algorithm for this technique initially calculates the a priori 
probabilities for the normal and abnormal packets both at the sender and receiver ends. 
These values were further used in finding the threshold probabilities to be compared to the 
corresponding probabilities of future incoming packets. Figure 3 shows how one channel 
from the network can be represented. The following describes the developed algorithm. 
 
AS
NS
AR
NR
Entry point of 
network or link 
(sender) 
Node or end of 
link (receiver)
 
Fig. 3. Discrete binary communication channel for this approach 
At Entry Point of Network (E): 
1. Classify packets as normal and abnormal.  
2. Count the number of packets entering the entire network, E.  
3. Count the number of normal packets entering the entire network, EN. 
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4. Count the number of abnormal packets entering the entire network, EA. 
5. Calculate the probability of an abnormal packet entering the entire network, P (AS). 
6. Calculate the probability of a normal packet entering the entire network, P (NS). 
Please note that the “entry point of network (sender)” could also be any node inside the 
network including the sole entry point of the network, since an attack could be sent from 
outside the network or from within the network. On the other hand, the “node (receiver)” 
could be any node inside the network excluding the sole entry point of the network. This 
implies that every link in the network can be considered as a discrete binary communication 
channel. 
It is assumed that a normal packet can be sent, but received as abnormal depending on 
what happened to it during the transition. The reverse sounds unrealistic, but possible 
and that was considered during the simulation studies. The following 2 x 2 matrix 
describing the transitional (conditional) probabilities in relation to the above figure had to 
be determined: 
( / ) ( / )
( / ) ( / )
R S R S
R S R S
P A A P N A
P A N P N N
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
Equation (10) calculates the total probability of receiving an abnormal packet at the node.  
 ( ) ( / ) * ( ) ( / ) * ( )R R S S R S SP A P A A P A P A N P N= +  (10) 
Equation (11) calculates the total probability of receiving a normal packet at the node.  
 ( ) ( / ) * ( ) ( / ) * ( )R R S S R S SP N P N A P A P N N P N= +  (11) 
Equation (12) calculates the a posteriori (conditional) probability that an abnormal packet 
was sent given that an abnormal packet was received. 
 
( / ) * ( )
( / )
( )
R S S
S R
R
P A A P A
P A A
P A
=  (12) 
Equation (13) calculates the a posteriori (conditional) probability that a normal packet was 
sent given that an abnormal packet was received. 
 
( / ) * ( )
( / )
( )
R S S
S R
R
P A N P N
P N A
P A
=  (13) 
Equation (14) calculates the a posteriori (conditional) probability that a normal packet was 
sent given that a normal packet was received. 
 
( / ) * ( )
( / )
( )
R S S
S R
R
P N N P N
P N N
P N
=  (14) 
Equation (15) calculates the a posteriori (conditional) probability that an abnormal packet 
was sent given that a normal packet was received. 
 
( / ) * ( )
( / )
( )
R S S
S R
R
P N A P A
P A N
P N
=  (15) 
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Choose the set of 2 x 2 transitional (conditional) probability matrices based on the 
assumptions made. 
Calculate the Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) decision rule by maximizing both a 
posteriori (conditional or after reception) probabilities within the rule (scenario 1).
Determine the best 2 x 2 transitional (conditional) probability matrix for the link based on 
the MAP decision rule. 
Repeat the same steps for scenario 2 by maximizing the first a posteriori (conditional or 
after reception) probability, but minimizing the second a posteriori (conditional or after 
reception) probability. This was a test for the choice of the best 2 x 2 transitional 
(conditional) probability matrix for the link.  
Classify packets as normal and abnormal.
Calculate the a priori probabilities that an abnormal (or normal) packet entered a node at 
the beginning of a particular link and was transmitted to the node at the end of that link.
Calculate the total probabilities of receiving abnormal and normal packets.
Calculate the a posteriori (conditional or after reception) probabilities for the four 
possibilities of sending and receiving packets on a particular link. 
 
Fig. 4. Algorithm for the developed IDS technique 
The MAP decision rule maximizes both the a posteriori (conditional) probability of receiving 
an abnormal packet and the a posteriori (conditional) probability of receiving a normal 
packet. This means choosing the higher a posteriori (conditional) probability between P 
(AS/AR) and P (NS/AR) and also choosing the higher a posteriori (conditional) probability 
between P (AS/NR) and P (NS/NR). This rule was considered in the first scenario. A modified 
version of the MAP decision rule, which placed more weight on the a posteriori 
(conditional) probability of receiving an abnormal packet, was considered in the second 
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scenario. That modified rule maximized the a posteriori (conditional) probability of 
receiving an abnormal packet and minimized the a posteriori (conditional) probability of 
receiving a normal packet. This meant choosing the higher a posteriori (conditional) 
probability between P (AS/AR) and P (NS/AR) and choosing the lower a posteriori 
(conditional) probability between P (AS/NR) and P (NS/NR). The total probability of a correct 
reception based on equation (6) is given by equation (16) as follows: 
 ( ) ( / ) * ( ) ( / ) * ( )R R R RP C P C A P A P C N P N= +  (16) 
This probability was further used to determine a threshold value for detecting intrusion or 
attacks or abnormal packets. Figure 4 describes the algorithm for the developed IDS 
technique. 
6. Simulation studies 
MATLAB 7.1 was used for the entire simulation studies. The preliminary results are shown 
in Table 1. P1 was the same as P(AS), P18 was the same as ( )P C  and each of matrices M(1) to 
M(13)  was the same as the 2 x 2 matrix, which had the transitional (conditional) 
probabilities as its elements. Various M values were used to describe the channel behavior 
during the simulation studies. These were the possible channel behaviors used in order to 
observe the outcomes of the decision rule. They were as follows: 
M(1) = [0.1 0.9; 0.1 0.9] – The probability of receiving an abnormal packet given that an 
abnormal packet was transmitted and the probability of receiving an abnormal packet given 
that a normal packet was transmitted were kept at the minimum level of 0.1. Also, the 
probability of receiving a normal packet given that an abnormal packet was transmitted and 
the probability of receiving a normal packet given that a normal packet was transmitted 
were kept at the maximum level of 0.9. Please note that the maximum and minimum 
probabilities were assumed to be 0.9 and 0.1 respectively. Two other intermediary 
probabilities were considered. They were 0.25 and 0.5. The idea was to consider the channel 
behavior during extreme and intermediary situations. This was how elements of the various 
matrices were defined for the simulation studies.  
 
M (2) = [0.5 0.5; 0.5 0.5];          M (3) = [0.9 0.1; 0.9 0.1];          M (4) = [0.9 0.9; 0.9 0.9] 
M (5) = [0.9 0.1; 0.5 0.9];          M (6) = [0.9 0.5; 0.1 0.9];          M (7) = [0.9 0.1; 0.1 0.9] 
M (8) = [0.9 0.5; 0.5 0.9];      M (9) = [0.9 0.25; 0.25 0.9];      M (10) = [0.9 0.1; 0.25 0.9] 
M (11) = [0.9 0.25; 0.1 0.9];    M (12) = [0.9 0.5; 0.25 0.9];    M (13) = [0.9 0.25; 0.5 0.9] 
 
The main reason for going through this random exercise was to determine the best matrix 
that guaranteed a consistent decision rule (threshold value). Two scenarios were considered 
in this study. The second scenario was undertaken in order to ascertain the consistency of 
the chosen matrix presented by the first scenario. Table 1 describes the results obtained from 
the first scenario. The above results were cross-checked by actually calculating the decision 
rule (threshold value) when P (AS) = 0.6, and P (NS) = 0.4, using M (7) = [0.9 0.1; 0.1 0.9] and 
comparing the result to what was obtained in Table 1. Both values were the same. 
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P18 or P(C) (Decision Rule or Total Probability of a Correct Reception) P1 or 
P(AS) M(1) M(2) M(3) M(4) M(5) M(6) M(7) M(8) M(9) M(10) M(11) M(12) M(13) 
              
0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.62 0.9 1.26 0.9 1.26 1.04 0.9 1.035 1.26 1.035 
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.44 0.9 1.12 0.9 1.12 0.92 0.9 0.92 1.12 0.92 
0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.26 0.9 0.98 0.9 0.98 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.98 0.9 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.08 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.08 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
0.3 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.26 0.98 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.98 
0.2 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.44 1.12 0.9 0.9 1.12 0.92 0.92 0.9 0.92 1.12 
0.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.62 1.26 0.9 0.9 1.26 1.04 1.035 0.9 1.035 1.26 
Table 1. Relationship between threshold values and a priori probabilities of abnormal 
packets (first scenario) 
7. Discussion 
The discussion here was made separately for each of the two scenarios for the sake of clarity. 
7.1 Discussion (scenario 1) 
The more realistic matrices out of the thirteen were chosen for further studies. Figure 5 
shows the graphs of threshold values and a priori probabilities of abnormal packets for all 
thirteen “M” matrices. Some of the above matrices were discarded because the probability of 
receiving a normal packet given that an abnormal packet was transmitted, P (NR/AS), was 
considered to be unrealistic so its corresponding value was kept at the minimum of 0.1 
throughout the simulation studies. Therefore, all the above matrices with P (NR/AS) values 
greater than 0.1 were discarded. This meant that only results from matrices M (3), M (5), M 
(7), and M (10) were chosen for further analysis. Figure 6 shows the graphs of threshold 
values and a priori probabilities of abnormal packets for those chosen “M” matrices for 
scenario 1. From figure 6, it was clear that results from matrices M(5), M(7), and M(10) 
follow virtually the same trend leaving out those from matrix M(3). From the definition of 
matrix M(3) (i. e., M(3) = [0.9 0.1; 0.9 0.1] ), the probability of receiving an abnormal packet 
given that a normal packet was transmitted, P(AR/NS) was 0.9, which represents an extreme 
situation, hence lower values for the decision rules or threshold values shown in both Table 
1 and figure 6. This left matrices M (5), M (7), and M (10) as the right matrices to consider 
further. The decision rules or threshold values obtained from using those three matrices 
were very high (i. e., always greater or equal to 0.9) 
Also, considering results from matrices M(5), M(7), and M(10), it is clear that  the probability 
of receiving an abnormal packet given that a normal packet was transmitted, P(AR/NS) must 
always be set between 0.1 and 0.9, but not equal to 0.9 in order to achieve high threshold 
values. Matrix M (7) stood out to be the best choice because results from matrices M (5) and 
M (10) had some decision rules or threshold values greater than 1.0, which were unrealistic. 
All threshold values from using matrix M (7) were lower than 1.0 and consistently 0.9, hence 
making  it a very realistic choice. In other  words, no  matter the  combination  of the a priori  
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Fig. 5. Graphs of threshold values and a priori probabilities of abnormal packets for all M 
Matrices 
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Fig. 6. Graphs of threshold values and a priori probabilities of abnormal packets for the four 
chosen Matrices (Scenario 1) 
probabilities of transmitting abnormal and normal packets, the decision rule would always 
stay at 0.9, which was high and consistent enough to detect or observe the presence of an 
abnormal packet at each node. Table 2 shows the results from scenario 2. Those results were 
again cross-checked by actually calculating the decision rule (threshold value) when P (AS) = 
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0.6, and P (NS) = 0.4, using M (7) = [0.9 0.1; 0.1 0.9] and comparing the result to what was 
obtained in Table 2. Both results were the same. The difference between this scenario and 
the first one lies with the decision rule, where the maximum a posteriori (conditional) 
probability was used in the first part of the rule and the minimum a posteriori (conditional) 
probability was used in the second part of the rule. In scenario 1 maximum a posteriori 
(conditional) probabilities were used for both parts of the rule. Figure 7 shows the graphs of 
threshold values and a priori probabilities of abnormal packets for those chosen “M” 
matrices for scenario 2.   
 
P18 or P(C) (Decision Rule or Total Probability of a Correct Reception) P1 or 
P(AS) M(1) M(2) M(3) M 4) M(5) M(6) M(7) M(8) M(9) M(10) M (11) M(12) M(13) 
              
0.9 0.18 0.5 0.82 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
0.8 0.26 0.5 0.74 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 
0.7 0.34 0.5 0.66 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.81 0.7 0.81 0.9 0.81 
0.6 0.42 0.5 0.58 0.9 0.6 0.84 0.6 0.84 0.69 0.6 0.69 0.84 0.69 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.58 0.5 0.58 0.7 0.58 
0.4 0.42 0.5 0.58 0.9 0.4 0.56 0.4 0.56 0.46 0.4 0.46 0.56 0.46 
0.3 0.34 0.5 0.66 0.9 0.38 0.42 0.3 0.5 0.35 0.3 0.35 0.42 0.43 
0.2 0.26 0.5 0.74 0.9 0.42 0.28 0.2 0.5 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.3 0.45 
0.1 0.18 0.5 0.82 0.9 0.46 0.14 0.1 0.5 0.03 0.24 0.12 0.28 0.48 
Table 2. Relationships between threshold values and a priori probabilities of abnormal 
packets (second scenario) 
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Fig. 7. Graphs of threshold values and a priori probabilities of abnormal packets for the four 
chosen Matrices (Scenario 2) 
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7.2 Discussion (scenario 2) 
Results from matrices M(3), M(5), M(7), and M(10) were chosen for analysis in this scenario 
based on the same reasons used in scenario 1 (i. e., P(NR/AS) must be equal to 0.1). It was 
clear from Figure 7 that all the above chosen matrices followed almost the same trend. Only 
results from matrix M (7) were very consistent and looked most realistic. This outcome 
further supported the choice of matrix M (7) made in scenario 1. 
7.3 Multiresolution techniques 
A multiresolution technique is an application of wavelet transform, which decomposes an 
image and reconstructs it after transmission, with the aim of reproducing the exact image. 
The decomposition (or decimation) process involves convolving data samples from the 
image with low pass and high pass wavelet coefficients (i. e. h0 and h1, respectively). This 
process is also known as sampling. The reconstruction (or interpolation) process involves 
convolving the received data after decomposition and transmission with the transformed (i. 
e. reflection in the line y = x or 180° rotation about the origin) low pass and high pass 
wavelet coefficients. This process is also known as upper-sampling. The high pass portion of 
the multiresolution technique eliminates any noise associated with the two major processes. 
The low pass portion of the technique, which contains no noise, is therefore projected 
further. It contains much of the energy content of the original data samples. Data received 
from the two portions of the technique are finally summed up to reproduce the original 
image.  
Only the signal processing applications of wavelets was taken advantage of in this research 
work. In the field of signal analysis, the methods of wavelet transform have wide 
applications because of their unique merit. One of the important applications is 
multiresolution technique, which was used to decompose, transmit and reconstruct signals 
or data from the enterprise network to a Central Detection Point for further analysis. 
Multiresolution technique simultaneously represents segments of an image or data by 
multiple scales and further consists of two very important concepts, that is, dilation and 
translation. Multiresolution Haar transform, which is a multiresolution technique using 
Haar wavelets coefficients, produces detail information of segments from an image or data 
as described in (Yung-Da & Paulik, 1996). Transmission of traffic from the network nodes to 
the central detection point for the technique developed in this research work was done 
using a one-dimensional, two-stage multiresolution technique. Haar Wavelets was applied 
here. The effectiveness of multiresolution Haar transform was also taken advantage of in 
(Piscaglia & Maccq, 1996).   
8. Implementation of IDS technique 
Implementation of this IDS technique involves two major parts: “set-up inside the network” 
and “set-up at the central detection point.” The following should be the steps under the “set-
up inside the network” part: 
1. Install a detector (i. e. software on a computer) at each node for classifying packets as 
normal and abnormal based on parameters like Hurst parameter, packet arrival rate, 
packet inter-arrival time etc.; and counting both types of packets arriving at that 
particular node within a given interval; and 
2. Install a transmitter at each node for sending the packet count data to the central 
detection point by multi-resolution technique. 
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The following should be the steps under the “set-up at the central detection point” part: 
1. Install a receiver to receive the packet count data from the network (i. e. at the end of 
the multi-resolution technique); 
2. Consider each link between any two nodes for the entire analysis from here; 
3. Calculate all the necessary probabilities for both normal and abnormal packets at the 
beginning and at the end of each link over a given period of time for further analysis; and 
4. Determine the decision rule (or threshold) for each link in the network for further 
analysis as discussed under the simulation studies above. 
9. Conclusion 
Based on the discussion under this technique, it was clear that matrix M (7) was the best 
choice out of the thirteen choices because it showed the strongest consistency under both 
scenarios. This matrix will therefore be applied at the implementation stage of this work. 
This approach established a relationship between a priori probabilities of both abnormal 
and normal packets on one side and threshold values on the other. This relationship will 
help determine the threshold values at the implementation stage of this work no matter the 
combination of abnormal and normal a priori probability pairs, due to its consistency.  
10. Contributions 
Results obtained so far from this IDS technique look promising. This IDS technique seeks to 
help eliminate the following limitations: limited scalability (i. e. partly by reducing traffic in 
the network); effectiveness (i. e. reducing false positive and false negative rates); efficiency 
(i. e. saving bandwidth); and security (i. e. securing security data). It also seeks to counter 
DDoS attacks based on SYN-flood attacks or distributed attacks in general and also SYN-
flood attacks in particular, if used as a back-up for existing IDSs. These were the main 
underlying objectives of this research work.  
11. Future work  
The following should be considered for further investigation: to re-determine the upper and 
lower limits of the probability of receiving an abnormal packet given that a normal packet 
was transmitted, P(AR/NS) for matrix M; and to consider a model with multiple entry 
points. Implementation of this IDS technique (prototype) should be done in order to further 
justify the contributions made so far. The performance of the IDS techniques should be 
determined based on the following metrics: 
• False positive rate (FPR); 
• False negative rate (FNR); and 
• Crossover error rate (CER).  
The possibility of extending this developed technique to secure wireless networks should be 
considered after the performance study. 
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